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Abstract
Purpose – Developed countries agreed at COP15 to pay US$100bn annually for adaptation and mitigation
in developing countries. This paper aims to evaluate how prepared are donors and recipients to spend this
money well by analyzing institutional and organizational capabilities for climate change adaptation in least
developed country (LDC) administrations using the case of Nepal, a country which can be considered to be an
archetypal LDC.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors conducted over 100 in-depth structured qualitative
interviews with government ofﬁcials from across the organizational chain in the ministries concerned with
climate change, ranging from the lowest-ranked employee to just under the ministerial ranks. This was
supplemented with detailed surveys of three representative communities from different ecological zones in
Nepal. Data were analyzed using Ostrom’s IAD framework.
Findings – Local administrations are more motivated and capable than are given credit for by donors but
nevertheless face critical barriers in being able to function autonomously and confront climate change
challenges. These barriers create three interrelated challenges: An organizational challenge to create intrinsic
incentives which empower and grant autonomy to front line agents, an institutional challenge to go beyond
accountability-focused process validation and a policy-choice challenge which avoids the temptation to write
aspirational policies without clear and feasible strategies to obtain the resources necessary for their
implementation.
Practical implications – The ﬁndings point to ways climate assistance can be restructured for more
reach and effectiveness.
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Originality/value – This paper ﬁlls a gap in the literature because community structures and institutions
have been extensively analyzed in the context of adaptation, but despite being criticized, administrative
structures have rarely been directly studied.
Keywords Agriculture, Nepal, Donors, Public administration, Forestry, Climate change adaptation
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
At the Copenhagen Conference of Parties (COP15) in 2009, developed countries committed to
funding (by 2020) climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries
to the tune of US$100bn annually. While the modalities of climate ﬁnance are still being
worked out – there are debates about the relative amounts of funds which should come out
of the public and private sectors and about the relative amounts which should be spent on
adaptation and low-carbon development – the least developed countries (LDCs) have
already started receiving substantially increased ﬂows.
Our paper stems from concerns about the effectiveness of these expenditures, and it
investigates the challenges faced by donors and local administrations in the LDCs to spend
this money well. We address this issue using the case of Nepal, which can be considered to
be an archetypical LDC with problems associated with internal socio-ethnic cleavages, weak
government, political conﬂict and uncertainty, severe organizational resource constraints
and, of course, widespread poverty. Our analysis, grounded in the case and based on over
100 in-depth structured qualitative interviews with government personnel from across
different organizational chains as well as detailed surveys of three representative
communities, identiﬁes the critical barriers government agencies face in being able to
function autonomously and confront the challenges of climate change. By providing a
comprehensive empirical analysis of the institutional and organizational capabilities for
climate change adaptation in the public sectors, we address critical questions about whether
and how LDCs can absorbmore donor funding and about the risks and returns involved.
This research ﬁlls an important gap in the literature. While the concept of adaptive
capacity has been in conceptual and theoretical development for decades, the empirical
examination of such capacities is still scarce (Lemos et al., 2013). The IPCC had noted that in
contrast to the scientiﬁc research on natural systems, research on social systems and
institutions is not as voluminous. Partly because of this, adaptation concerns have been
discussed and dissected much less than mitigation ones (IPCC, 2007; Klein et al., 2005)
leading to an ongoing challenge in the development of practicable knowledge about climate
change adaptation. Fortunately, over the past few years, a substantial literature has begun
to emerge on adaptation issues, which is both theoretical (Folke, 2006), and place-based
(Goldman and Riosmena, 2013; Jones and Boyd, 2011). Most of these studies, especially in
developing countries, have initiated the research agenda by focusing ﬁrst on communities.
Government and administrative structures have not yet been extensively analyzed. Even
many critiques of administrative structures, for example the case of forest rights in
Springate-Baginski et al. (2013), have generally reported from the communities’ points of
view without performing an institutional or organizational analysis of the bureaucracies
themselves. Meanwhile, most of the information available about the public sector and
climate expenditures in the LDCs is anecdotal. By formally investigating public
administration, our paper complements the research on local community-based institutions
for climate change adaptation.
In Nepal too, there are no comprehensive analyses of public administrations and climate
change or about how these institutions and corresponding organizations are responding to
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climate challenges. Among the existing studies, Yates (2012) found that institutional
responses to vulnerability are highly variable, depending often on physical distances from
decision-making structures. In his analysis, vulnerability is a representational issue. Jones
and Boyd (2011) analyzed how embedded social processes create discriminatory practices
based on caste and gender which are barriers for adaptation action. Other studies such as
Onta and Resurreccion (2011) focused on elite control and gendered responses to adaptation
capacities in Nepal, shedding light on problems with a broader distribution of entitlements.
From these studies, we can conclude that community-based institutions are prey to
traditional social and ethic cleavages, but still none of these studies engaged with wider sets
of the relevant structures of public action, such as government and administrative
organizations, to see whether the latter were more or less subject to these cleavages.
In the absence of such studies, the public sector is usually caricaturized in Nepal and
elsewhere as incapable, unmotivated and rent-seeking and little effort is made either to
understand the constraints under which the public sector operates or to theorize on how to
leverage its existing resources for climate change adaptation. Thus, while they are arguably
among the most important institutions in the development and environment spheres, public
sector organizations in developing countries have often remained a bystander in climate
adaptation initiatives. In an analysis of 118 adaptation cases drawn from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) database, Agrawal (2010) ﬁnds that
in the overwhelming majority of cases (102 out of 118) civic organizations worked alone in
facilitating adaptation to climate change, while public organizations working alone ﬁgured
in only six cases. The dominance of civic organizations in this arena can be explained
mostly by the centrality of donor funding for climate change adaptation in the LDCs which
tends towards contracting NGOs and CSOs to conduct project-based adaptation activities
but while these may have several advantages vis-á-vis the public sector, notably in the
spheres of probity and attitudes, the former also suffer from several critical limitations –
particularly in terms of territorial reach, funding dependence, continuity and a
programmatic focus – and it should not be expected that they can credibly supplant the
latter in achieving long-term transformative goals based on, as Banks et al. (2015) put it,
their success in service delivery projects of modest and discrete scale.
2. Conceptual approaches to investigating institutional and organizational
capabilities for climate change adaptation
2.1 Spheres of adaptation action: a focus on livelihoods
Adaptive capacity is generally understood to mean the ability of a community to deal with
its vulnerability to exogenous shocks and maintain its viability and welfare. It is known to
be a function of both the resources available to the community and the decision-making
processes through which a community distributes and expends these resources in
anticipation of or in reaction to a shock. The relevant resources include productive and
ﬁnancial assets as well as knowledge and practices.
Adaptation initiatives and research in the LDCs usually focus on livelihood strategies
(Paavola, 2008; Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009). This approach operates under the assumption
that vulnerability is a function of the available livelihood options (Jodha, 2005) and that the
poor are especially vulnerable to environmental shocks because of their dependence on
natural resources for subsistence and income (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). Although
Agarwal (2010) argues that development and adaptation are two separate conceptual
spheres because the latter is explicitly focused on being able to deal with unpredictable
variations in outputs rather than on reducing poverty levels, the two are closely intertwined
because poverty limits the investments a community can make in protective and productive
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infrastructure and the buffers that it can accumulate for dealing with shocks. Moreover,
there is a large body of literature which argues for mainstreaming climate change adaption
and risk management into developmental processes (Huq et al., 2004). In the case of Nepal
itself, for example, Biggs et al. (2013) found that most adaptation strategies in the
agricultural sector were developmental. Thus, even if the concepts of development and
adaptation are distinct, they are objectively linked in poorer societies and the institutions
and organizations which deal with livelihood, development and climate change are the same
or work in overlapping spheres, even if they do not always collaborate.
In sector-speciﬁc terms, grounded research on adaptation action generally focuses on a
well-known set of productive sectors. In the case of Nepal, the relevant sectors are identiﬁed
by its UNFCCC mandated National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) as forests and
agriculture. The research agenda in both these areas is well-developed, and the literature
available in these arenas informs the kinds of adaptation action which are needed and the
roles public agencies may need to play in these arenas.
2.1.1 Forests. In the case of forests, there is an extensive literature linking livelihoods
and conservation, but the assumption that there is a win-win between conservation and
poverty alleviation does not ﬁnd unequivocal evidence (Sunderlin et al., 2005; Agrawal and
Redford, 2006) and the outcomes seem to depend strongly on contextual factors (Persha
et al., 2011). Nevertheless, forests do play a role as a shock-absorber which makes it directly
relevant from an adaptation perspective.
A major shift in forestry management in developing countries over the past few decades
has been the progressive devolution of rights and responsibilities to the communities which
live in and around these areas. Many legislative battles and community struggles have been
extensively documented and the outcomes of community forestry have also been
comprehensively studied, the conclusions being generally favorable though cautious. The
logic of community forestry is based on virtuous local collective action, but while the
conditions for ensuring these virtuous structures might sometimes appear spontaneously, in
the majority of cases where they do not quite some social engineering is required because of
the number of variables involved for successful community action, by one count (Agrawal,
2001) over 30.
The literature thus presents the key challenges of forestry from a livelihoods perspective
as to ﬁrst ensure that forest resources are protected for the local communities and then at a
subsequent stage to ensure that these resources are exploited to create community assets
and income opportunities rather than rents. Insofar as using forest resources for sustainable
livelihood generation is concerned, researchers have found that in Nepal forests currently
contribute only between 3 to 11 per cent of total income for the poorest forest dwellers even
as many forest areas in the plains and high mountains are still underutilized, indicating that
allowing more commercial timber harvests could be a win-win opportunity (Meilby et al.,
2014). However, they do not address the institutional requirements or change processes that
might be needed to introduce desirable ﬂexibility in forest management. Meanwhile
attempts by the state to reassert some degree of control over the forest are severely opposed
and criticized (Sunam et al., 2013), indicating that there are contentious political issues which
need to be resolved.
2.1.2 Agriculture. In the case of LDCs, the relevant unit of analysis of agriculture from an
adaptation perspective is the smallholder farm. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) estimates that over 98 per cent of all farm holdings worldwide are family-based and
indeed most adaptation projects in Nepal also deal with communities where small holder
farming is the dominant mode of production. Here, there is an extensive literature which,
arguing that more research and development on its own now has limited potential for
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increasing productivity and well-being, engages with the issue of inserting small family
farms into more commercial value chains as a means of agricultural development (Lowitt
et al., 2015), thus combining the push of agricultural extension work with the pull of market
networks. These chains include not only the more sophisticated and widely reported-on
global value chains but also those between rural communities and local markets. Another
stream in the literature on rural livelihoods emphasizes the importance of income
diversiﬁcation strategies to both increase and smooth net incomes, mirroring in a sense the
advice given to investors on portfolio diversiﬁcation. This presents an intriguing challenge
because some researchers have identiﬁed dueling arguments on the competing beneﬁts
accruing from specialization and diversiﬁcation, pointing to how value chains may
undermine traditional diversiﬁcation practices through a greater emphasis on market
relations (Jodha, 2005).
While the literature and the associated debates indicate the need for a more intensive
accompaniment of agricultural development in the most vulnerable areas to coordinate
insertion and diversiﬁcation, the role of the state and public sector organizations has been
underappreciated in the resilience literature. The main challenges to rural development
which have been identiﬁed so far, including land tenure, ﬁnance, economic scale and
productivity, clearly argue that beyond a few project-based initiatives, only the public sector
is potentially capable of addressing these at a regional scale. The alternative, of course, is
that market forces will shape these spheres in their own inimitable way where the outcomes
can be positive but in reality have so far have usually been problematic for vulnerable
communities and groups, especially women (Chege et al., 2015; Wood, et al., 2013). While
much adaptation work is still not routed through the government, some have started to
recognize that international organizations and donors were wrong in promoting a reduced
public sector role in agricultural development (FAO, 2013).
In Nepal, as agriculture still represents 34 per cent of economic production and as 81 per cent
of the population still resides in rural areas and depends at least partly on agriculture[1], the
potential effect of climate change on agriculture is a signiﬁcant threat to well-being. Climate
models suggest that although the total amount of water available for agriculture may not
decrease in Nepal –with increased snow-melt balancing more irregular monsoons and increased
evapotranspiration – increasing variability of weather punctuated by potentially more frequent
natural calamities may have serious consequences on crops (Eriksson et al., 2009). Climate
change impacts are already visible in agriculture, with both positive and negative effects. On the
positive side, increasing temperatures allows crops to grow at higher altitudes and for longer
periods. On the negative side, farmers report production at lower altitudes is suffering from
more irregular water availability, increased pest attacks and heat damage, both phenomena
requiring place-based interventions.
3. Methodology
As our objective is to provide a structural-institutional perspective on the organizational
performance for managing climate challenges in Nepal, we study the effects both of formal
rules and regulations, and of organizational structures and organizational capacities on
decision-making in communities and administrative agencies. In our study, we make a
distinction between organizations and institutions. We treat the former as constellations of
agents with both a common purpose and individual interests, while we approach
institutions as the formal and informal, written and customary rules and ways of behavior
which guide decisions in deﬁned arenas. Thus, unlike many other scholars, our approach
classiﬁes the various ministries as organizations because we are more focused on their
interests and motivations, while we treat the community forest users groups (CFUGs)
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described below as an institution because we are more interested in how rules affect the
decisions taken within them. This is also consistent with the approach in Ostrom’s
Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) framework. This framework allows researchers to
organize “diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry” by identifying the major types of structural
variables in a multi-tier conceptual map (Ostrom, 2011, 2007). IAD, in particular, developed
the concept of an action arena – consisting of an action situation and actors – within which
the researcher can study the way relevant variables interact to determine actors’ decisions
and the outcomes which result. It has been used in a variety of resource-use settings ranging
from ﬁsheries management (Imperial and Yandle, 2005; Rudd, 2004) and land-use planning
(Pethe et al., 2012) to co-management (Whaley andWeatherhead, 2014).
We use this framework for our research, deﬁning the action arenas that are most relevant
to studying Nepal’s responses to climate change and then studying their operational rules
and organizational resources to understand the nature of the spaces within which decisions
about resource use and livelihood planning under climate change pressures are taking place.
3.1 Case selection
Sandwiched between the Tibetan Plateau and the Gangetic Plains, Nepal is divided roughly
evenly among the high mountains, middle hills and the plains forests. For our study, we
selected three rural districts (based on suggestions by relevant stakeholders) representative
of each of these geographic zones to incorporate variation in remoteness and community
structures (Table I; Figure 1)[2]. In each of the districts, we concentrated on two action
arenas which were identiﬁed by Nepal’s NAPA and other stakeholders as being especially
relevant to adaptation activities: forest management and agricultural development. The
apex ministries in these arenas are the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation (MoFSC)
and the Ministry of Agricultural Development (MoAD). As indicated in Nepal’s NAPA,
Table I.
Detail of study sites
Item Plains/Terai Middle hills High mountain
District name Chitwan Gorkha Dolakha
Location
(Province)
Central Development Region Western Development Region Central Development
Region
Main
livelihoods
Agriculture, livestock,
poultry, wage/salary,
Agriculture and livestock,
foreign employment, daily
wage labor
Agriculture and livestock,
businesses, government
jobs
Total area 2238 sq. km 3610 sq. km 2191 sq.km
Poverty Rate 8.89% 20.41% 25.99%
Population 579,984 271,061 186,557
GDP (in
million US$)
338.98 106.72 65.34
Infrastructure
and
accessibility
88.90 km national highway,
83.49 km feeder road and
61.00 km postal road
96.2% of households have
improved source of drinking
water
94.1% of households have
toilet facility
86.3% of households have
electricity for lighting
279.24 km feeder road and 31
km mid hills road
65.4 % of households have
improved source of drinking
water
73% of households have toilet
facility
76.7% of households have
electricity for lighting
258.75 km feeder road
78.5% of households have
improved source of
drinking water
69.5 % households have
toilet facility
82.1% of households have
electricity for lighting
Source: Adapted from: GoN (2013, 2014a, 2014b and 2016a)
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several other ministries and departments are also relevant for a more complete approach to
climate change management but a scoping exercise we performed determined that a more
comprehensive treatment including these other organizations would be mostly duplicative.
3.2 Data collection and analysis
We conducted over 100 hour-long structured open-ended interviews with government
ofﬁcials from across organizational chains in the concerned ministries as well as with
villagers, quizzing them on climate change knowledge, policies, administrative conditions
and community decision-making structures. The interview questions for government
ofﬁcials varied slightly based on the rank of the interviewee while those for villagers were
standard. In the villages, we purposively interviewed both men and women, those from
different castes, and community members who were active in community decision-making
structures and those who were merely passive participants. Some of the enquiries were of a
sensitive nature, so sometimes we used multiple questions with different phrasings to
enable triangulation. Data collected were analyzed mostly qualitatively in the manner in
which Feldman et al. (2004) described as beneﬁcial for studying public administration, i.e. in
using events, experiences and actions to understand a meaningful whole.
4. Arenas for climate change adaptation action
Here, we discuss the critical institutional and organizational dynamics we found in the
selected action arenas and make some concluding observations which indicate the areas of
particular concern to climate adaptation interventions. The aggregate table of IAD ﬁndings
using its formal terminology is presented below and followed by a discussion of the salient
observations. This table and the discussions following clearly show that authority and
aggregation rules are oriented toward validating processes rather than developing
livelihood-based solutions to addressing climate challenges (Table II).
4.1 Forest management
About half of Nepal’s forests are under traditional government management, while about 34
per cent are under community control. National Parks areas, which are under special
management systems, make up 17 per cent of the country’s forest areas. Private forests are
Figure 1
Study sites
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negligible. With the 1993 Forest Act and the 1995 Forest Regulations, government-managed
forests were increasingly transferred to community control exercised by CFUGs, and it is
expected that this trend will continue.
CFUGs are broad-based organizations open to all community members who make
collective decisions over levels of extraction of forest products, especially timber, and
formally have collective responsibilities for determining extraction, distribution and
maintenance of forest resources. They raise money from forest product royalties
and membership dues and spend them on community infrastructures and other social and
development programs.
CFUGs have clear rules regarding the composition of their management committees,
which includes mandatory representation of women and disadvantaged groups.
Representation does not of course guarantee genuine participation. Responses to the
question on who speaks the least in meetings generally showed that it was women and
ethnic minorities or theDalits. But while the observation of one woman in the CFUG that she
was in the committee only “to fulﬁll the quota of women” is an accurate characterization of
the nature of many women’s involvement in community management structures, it is not the
only type of outcome. A few women who have participated in these committees report
greater and continuing awareness and involvement in community resource management.
The results in terms of the empowerment of disadvantaged groups are therefore varied and
often depend on idiosyncratic factors like strength of personality. Nevertheless, the space
created by CFUGs is progressively lowering the bar for genuine participation of
disadvantaged groups.
Our question to community members as to who beneﬁts the most from CFUGs elicited an
interesting contrast. While some of the poorer respondents indicated that the wealthier
beneﬁtted more because they were able to purchase more of the timber on offer by the
CFUG, some of the better-off respondents as well as some of the poorer ones responded that
the weaker groups beneﬁtted more because the CFUG royalties funded earmarked beneﬁts
such as scholarships for poor children. This indicates that certain protocols have the effect
of establishing and at least minimally safeguarding entitlements for the weakest community
members. So while we can conﬁrm the distributional biases in CFUGs found by others
(Iversen et al., 2006), we can also see that the biases do not completely erode the entitlements.
While some rules of community forest management, such as those related to
representation, have contributed to better securing economic entitlements for the poorest,
others have prevented community forests from playing a signiﬁcant role in local economic
growth. Rules guiding CFUG management allow only subsistence-level of timber extraction
by community members. A typical family, we were told, might collect 30 kg of ﬁrewood and
210 kg of fodder per week, in addition to about 50 cubic feet of timber for house construction
or repair when required. This is not insigniﬁcant, but certainly it is too little to transform
livelihoods. Although the CFUGs do charge royalty for timber, the allowed cut is rather
small. Our ﬁndings thus reﬂect the consensus among many researchers (Meilby et al., 2014)
that forests in Nepal are underused, even though there is persistent demand for more timber.
Almost all administrative agency respondents pointed out severe resource constraints in
personnel, equipment and funds to execute mandated tasks. These inhibit MoFSC staff’s
ability to enforce rules related to forest encroachment and timber smuggling. Field level
staff repeatedly indicated that they cannot prosecute offenders. As one Ranger put it, “we
don’t even have a vehicle to take the offender before a judge.” Even if the vehicle were
available, local politicians almost always intervene to ensure that cases are never brought
before a judge. Enforcement is therefore limited to at most conﬁscating the timber or
temporarily impounding cattle grazing without a permit (though these are quickly released
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as the forest department would otherwise have to itself provide fodder for these animals).
But most breaches are never detected. As one Ranger noted, he has to look after 58 forest
parcels and, lacking transport, does not visit most of them. Similar limitations also prevent
MoFSC ﬁeld staff from carrying out accurate and complete forest inventories. Indeed, when
questioned about which tasks they are not able to perform because of resource limitations,
the most common answer was forest inventory and management, which is their primary
responsibility. Instead, managing CFUG affairs took upmost of their time.
This is one of the main reasons behind the failure to develop strategies for employing
forest resources to transform livelihoods. Governance structures are partly responsible for
the rules which result in low economic activity around forests products. Transfer of forests
to the CFUGs does not remove the MoFSC from the picture. CFUG protocols, heavily tutored
by donors whose focus was more on conservation, require preparation of forest
management plans which include basic inventorying for determining sustainable harvest
levels, and it is the local staff of the MoFSC which prepare these plans. Indeed, much of the
time of the ﬁeld staff of the MoFSC goes into preparing these plans and because it is an
administrative requirement, the preparation of the plans takes precedence over on-the-
ground activities such as patrolling. However, the plans are often ritualistic for even the
basic inventorying of the forest which is required to prepare them is usually not done
because of manpower and basic equipment shortages. Without an adequate inventory, an
increase in forest exploitation can be risky. The conservationist approach followed by the
forest staff is justiﬁed to some extent because a permissive management approach would
require monitoring capabilities which are beyond the reach of the MoFSC and therefore
almost blanket-bans are necessary to simplify the task environment. Our respondents
indicated that the prohibitive bias and administrative restrictions and regulations in the
management of community forests prevent most forms of economic exploitation, and this
extends even to the few tracts of private forests. Such approaches result in little being done
for forest-dependent communities beyond safeguarding subsistence level entitlements and
forest conservation.
Resource limitations also affect staff motivation. We gathered from interviews that
MoFSC staff believes itself to have technical skills in forest management issues and regret
that they are unable to practice what they refer to as Scientiﬁc Forest Management (SFM).
While they rarely have the time or the equipment to perform the tasks that validate them
professionally, they are also squeezed by community demands for which they are also
unprepared. One Ranger explained “Forest users do not want to upgrade the regulations.
The want us to do it, but we have enough budget only for preparing the operational plan.”
Organizational theory posits that resource constraints generally lead to conﬂict and in
this environment we would expect to ﬁnd a strained relationship between forest staff and
communities, but our ﬁndings are more nuanced. The literature from India, for example,
claims that forest bureaucracies actively resist community rights (Matta and Kerr, 2007;
Kumar and Kant, 2005). In Nepal, however, the forest staff has a more balanced view on the
matter. Almost everyone interviewed expressed themselves in favor of community forest
management and said they had good relations with the CFUG despite also reporting that
there are frequent conﬂicts with the community. They recognized that they lacked the
ability to adequately patrol and protect the forests and that community management
reduces the number and extent of local level violations but they also remarked that
community members (and this was conﬁrmed by the villagers) now tended to exploit state
forests more.
Where conﬂicts with communities did arise, forest department ofﬁcials said they were a
result of community members attempting to extract more than what CFUG operational
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plans allow them to and these, the forest staff responded, are resolved by explaining the
rules to the community and, often, involving the local politicians to intercede. We also
enquired from community members as to who breaks the rules. Rather than point to the
existence of some timber maﬁa, we were told that it is the poor who most often break the
rules because they extract ﬁrewood to sell and supplement their meager incomes. This also
explains the reluctance of forest staff and CFUG management committees to strictly enforce
rules.
4.2 Agricultural production
Economic conditions underlying Nepal’s agriculture are challenging. In all the three sites we
visited, production of staples such as rice and maize was at subsistence levels and even
though there is potentially productive land lying fallow (about 10 per cent according to
several respondents) and a preference for local varieties, unavailability of labor because of
outmigration and inability to compete on price terms with imports because of insufﬁcient
capital inputs are substantial barriers to accessing markets[3]. Production of staples is
nevertheless an important source of consumption in what are essentially cash-poor local
societies and so to climate-proof farming is an imperative.
Unlike the CFUGs in forestry, agriculture in Nepal has no dedicated community
deliberative space. The local agricultural technicians are under the District Agricultural
Development Ofﬁce (DADO) and in most cases villagers must approach DADO directly for
access to programs and beneﬁts. Here, there are no clear rules regarding agricultural
program entitlements, as these vary from program to program and most farmers
interviewed reported little familiarity regarding these entitlements.
Resource limitations are more keenly felt in agricultural extension than in forest
management. Diffusing knowledge and innovation on how to deal with climate change is
labor intensive and requires personal visits to individual households and hamlets over an
extended period. Junior Technical Assistants (JTAs), the ﬁeld-level agricultural extension
workers, felt it physically impossible, given current stafﬁng levels, to engage with the
farmers to the extent which is necessary to spread knowledge and innovative practices.
As a result of resources limitations, JTAs gravitate toward providing services to the less
vulnerable middle status farmers, even though the ofﬁcial policy is to prioritize poorer and
backward classes. When queried about which persons most use their services, the JTAs
indicate that middle class farmers who are “more likely to help themselves” and to “continue
to follow the program and instructions.” According to one JTA from Gorkha, only 10 per
cent of farmers are interested in receiving information, while another asserted it was those
who lived near the road, those who returned from foreign employment, those with medium
wealth and men who were most proactive in approaching JTAs. One JTA was more
categorical: “Brahmin and Chhetri farmers are more receptive, indigenous groups are slower
and the Dalits are the most disinterested.” These responses may reﬂect local prejudices, but
they are in line with the long-established sociological literature on agricultural innovation
which claims that it is the wealthier, more educated and higher status farmers who ﬁrst
adopt an innovation while poorer agriculturalists with smaller land holdings lag behind
(Rogers, 1962). Given the fact that the programs themselves are insufﬁciently funded to
reach all potential recipients, attention is rationed by the logic of convenience according to
which persons that require the least outreach efforts receive services. Local inequalities are
exacerbated as a result. For example, one JTA reported that the DADO allocated Nepalese
Rupees 40,000 (US$370) for promoting beekeeping among unemployed youth, but many
better-off farmers accessed this program instead.
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As in the case of forest management, resource limitations generate conﬂict, which is
again mediated with the help of local political parties. One JTA put the whole cycle quite
succinctly:
Limited program is disbursed from the district level, while the demand from farmers is high. This
causes conﬂict while distributing program to farmer. Mostly the problem is solved by taking help
from local politicians.
Not surprisingly, the majority of villagers who do not receive services reported being
dissatisﬁed with the DADO. Dissatisfaction was the highest among those who have
received no services and not had any contact with JTAs, while satisfaction levels were
higher among those who had received some beneﬁts such as subsidized seeds. Queried
about whether they believed DADO has sufﬁcient resources to provide the full extent of
services desired by the community, many respondents said they believe that it did while
only a few recognized the stafﬁng constraints and almost none recognized the ﬁnancial
limitations. Such low levels of satisfaction can call into question legitimacy of the state
apparatus unless the true extent of resource limitation is broadly understood.
Given this state of affairs, the proposed policy initiative within the MoAD to explore and
prioritize off-farm employment is one of several examples of efforts which cannot be
supported with the resources on the ground. Indeed, in our interviews, none of the
agricultural department ofﬁcials said they had any knowledge about ministerial initiatives
to promote off-farm employment, a policy initiative which is clearly stated in the NAPA.
Similarly, other interventions suggested by the rural development literature for livelihood
improvements such as greater emphasis on market deepening (rather than just improving
local productivity which may often lead to production gluts) are impossible without
increasing stafﬁng and funding in decentralized public agriculture agencies. In the
meantime, villagers respond that they are haphazardly adapting to climate change by
switching to varieties which require less water and by increasing their use of pesticides and
fungicides.
5. Discussion: the state and adaptation capabilities in Nepal
In this study, we focused on the effects of formal and informal rules and of organizational
capacities on decision-making in communities and in the front lines of administrative
agencies in Nepal. In our interviews with both community members and administrative
staff, we asked detailed questions about climate change impacts and responses, and
we found that overall both groups of actors possessed detailed knowledge about climate
vulnerabilities. We also reviewed Nepal’s major climate policy documents, including NAPA,
LAPA, Forest Sector Strategies, etc., and found them to be comprehensive and detailed.
Indeed, many analysts (Ford et al., 2013) consider Nepal’s adaptation policies among the best
in the world. Yet, despite this ﬁeld level knowledge, comprehensive policies and the
emergence of a growing epistemic community dedicated to responding to climate change,
we found in our investigation of forests and agriculture in Nepal that implementation of
climate adaptation strategies is superﬁcial, uneven and inadequate.
In particular, we found institutional frameworks have been more successful in securing
entitlements than in creating initiatives to address climate challenges by instigating social
processes of livelihoods protection and transformation. Although still not ideal,
representational safeguards in local level resource management and deliberative
developmental spaces such as the CFUG ensure levels of resource distribution and
transparency which are many degrees better than the situation which prevailed before these
spaces were constructed. In contrast, deﬁciencies in developing adaptation and resilience
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strategies based on livelihood improvements are severe. We trace these to administrative
agencies that are as weak as the communities they must serve and interventions outside the
administrative structures (i.e. by CSOs in donor-funded projects) that are sporadic and
dispersed. At the same time, we found front line workers frustrated with the lack of
resources for performing even theminimum of their assigned tasks.
Are the administrative staff in Nepal’s frontline agencies suitable to deal with these
challenges or are they incapable and disinterested? Rutt and Lund (2014) studied forestry
projects and found that donors preferred giving money to CSOs rather than governments
because they believed “capacity must precede empowerment” because the image of LDCs
administrations is one of incapability and disinterest. While they pointed to the dangers of
leaving government out, they did not actually study the local governments themselves and
relied on eliciting opinions from CSOs and donors, which is similar to what other researchers
on the issue have also done. By studying in detail the administrative structures as well as
the communities they serve, we are able to offer some triangulated observations on this
issue and ﬁnd that the Nepalese front line agency workers and local governments are neither
incapable nor disinterested.
In the interviews, almost no staff reported policy or procedural barriers to taking
initiative, although they did say there were no incentives other than self-satisfaction to
doing so. In spite of this, several staff members were able to describe speciﬁc occasions
when they acted on their own initiative indicating that frontline staff did see the ability to
deliver services and solve community problems to be motivational factors notwithstanding
the high levels of frustrations with working conditions. Moreover, they consistently
expressed a desire for more (and frustration with current) equipment and training, which
indicates that they do wish to receive validation from their work.
Intrinsic incentives for organizational performance – i.e. those which actors derive
merely form involvement in an activity and not from external rewards – are emphasized as
predictors of organizational success in the organizations literature based on psychology and
behavioral economics. We ﬁnd that these are not absent in Nepal. This is signiﬁcant because
behavioral research suggests that intrinsic incentives allow individual interests to align
more naturally with organizational interests (Frey et al., 2013). This stands in juxtaposition
to a principal-agent optic (which orthodox economists and donor agencies emphasize) that
require expensive agency-based enforcement structures. Such structures have high ﬁxed
costs and therefore economies of scale, which make them appropriate for wealthier and
larger economies but unaffordable in poorer and smaller ones. The takeaway from this is
that LDCs like Nepal cannot be expected to have the kinds of regulatory apparatus that
donor countries possess and expect and therefore more emphasis should be placed on the
cultivation of intrinsic incentives.
Intrinsic incentives still require adequate manpower and capacity for creative
organizational design of the kind vividly described by Tendler (1997) in the case of health-
care extension workers in Northeast Brazil – a case which was, in fact, predicated upon
massive hiring of new staff. Basic resources are also important. Our ﬁeld visits revealed that
while the capillary structures of the state are present in the districts and villages, they are
rudimentary and fragile. Almost no forest or agriculture ofﬁces exist beyond the district
level and even at the district level the quantity and quality of the construction and
equipment is a common cause for dissatisfaction among staff. Not infrequently, front line
staff have to work out of what they called “briefcase ofﬁces”, that is they lack even a
building to work in. In other cases, the ofﬁces themselves are in precarious conditions. One
of the district forest service ofﬁces we visited even had a tree branch precariously holding
up the roof. Many such ofﬁces collapsed in the 2014 earthquake.
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Rather than disinterest, Nepal’s public administration suffers from a mismatch
between expected responsibilities and available resources. Comparing the diffuse
responsibility and broader claims to government programs with the focused and
adequately funded (in terms of staff including expensive foreign experts, equipment and
salaries) donor programs will no doubt result in impressions of poor performance in the
former, especially among community members who are not in a position to understand
the background of differential access to ﬁnancial resources. This also explains incidence
of and frequent complaints about the low uptake by local governments of development
projects initiated by CSOs using donor funds.
Related to this, we ﬁnd that performance and organizational goals included in the
NAPA and associated plans (GoN, 2016b, 2014c, 2011a, 2011b) diverge too much from
organizational resources and capabilities for them to be realistic. These goals are not
trickling down to the ﬁeld level even though the policies are comprehensive in their texts
and the central government staff is well-versed in them. Not surprisingly,
implementation of these plans and the functioning of the new climate change
management organizations that they established are moribund. For example, the Climate
Change Council – a body whose establishment was mandated by the NAPA with the
responsibility for managing and coordinating various programs at the political level (it is
supposed to be chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of the ministers of all the
relevant ministries) and approving the annual Climate Change Fund expenditures – has a
Web page which was last updated in 2012 and referred to the fact that the Council had
met four times in 2010.
The tendency to overprescribe an agenda for LDC administrations – which derives from
the structural realities of climate change adaptation management where policy texts are
paid for by donors and written by consultants – comes with several attendant risks,
including that of a deteriorating relationship between governments and donors. While it
could be argued that identifying needed policy actions brings into sharp relief the capacity
gap which exists and in doing so provides also a road map for capacity development
(Willems and Baumert, 2003), our research and the empirical record over the past several
years indicates that the capacity gap is too large and the required resources for ﬁlling this
gap are still being negotiated, as a result of which policies such as the NAPAs are already
becoming obsolete and, worse yet, more promising and realistic policy options are not being
developed or implemented.
Instead, we found evidence from our interviews to suggest that a mismatch between
capacities and expectations are stressing relations between community members and state
structures. These constraints reinforce local-level asymmetries of power in access and in
entitlements as work pressures leave the staff unable, even if willing, to resist maneuvering
for privileged access to limited resources and programs. Because of this, low-level conﬂict
has increased as different interests grapple for the few resources that do trickle down.
Ambitious plans and policies as are generally written into most NAPAs create expectations
and a failure to fulﬁll these or lack of expectations management erodes trust and legitimacy
between a government and its citizens. This, in fact, may be one of the reasons that the
impression of an unresponsive state.
Moreover, if targets are not calibrated to capabilities, then the persistent tendency
towards failures engendered by the bridge-too-far syndrome erodes organizational and
individual self-conﬁdence and heightens passivity in the face of risks. Approaching the
issue of targets from the perspective of organizational psychology, March and Shapira
(1992) had theorized that risk-seeking behavior increases as the targets come into view. This
insight helps explain the idleness of bureaucracies in LDCs. Risk taking is essential in the
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process of ﬁnding and implementing solutions because the potential for error is inherent in
trial and learning processes. Risk averseness in organizations and societies that derives
from mistrust and resource constraints thus limits progress and increases passivity which,
in the presence of imminent threats like global climate change, exposes the entity to even
more danger.
6. Conclusions
The reliance of LDCs on donor ﬁnancing for climate change adaptation has introduced
several distortions which derive principally from:
 a lack of trust in the LDCs administrative structures and the consequent reliance on
contracting CSOs to propose and manage discrete projects; and
 a mismatch between ambitious climate change adaptation policies written by
consultants and on-the-ground capacities.
Bringing the government back in is a challenge and enabling administrative agencies to
address climate change rests on a tripod of solutions to what is partly an organizational
challenge, partly an institutional challenge and partly a policy-choice problem. The
organizational challenge is to be able to create protocols and intrinsic incentives which
empower and grant autonomy to front line workers, and to complement these with
necessary rightsizing of line departments so that abilities match expectations. Moreover,
given inevitable limitations on oversight capacity, more creative thought needs to be
directed towards improving intrinsic incentives for the staff. The institutional challenge,
given limited enforcement capabilities, is to reorient rules towards outcomes and search for
solutions that stimulate intrinsic rewards rather than towards process validation rules
which numbs them. Distribution of entitlements is important and we ﬁnd the ﬁrst
generation of reform in community forestry and village councils has made substantial
progress in these arenas. The second generation of reforms would need to build on this by
emphasizing local institutional arrangements which induce risk sharing and development.
Finally, the policy-choice challenge is to avoid the temptation to write aspirational policies
which do not have clear and feasible strategies to obtain the resources necessary for proper
policy implementation. The resulting policies may be less ambitious but more actionable
and would allow much better leveraging of institutional and organizational capacities and
potential that currently exist even as we wait for transformational developments in the ﬁeld
of climate change ﬁnance andmanagement.
While the practice of public management in the developed countries stresses autonomy
in public sector agencies based on neo-institutionalist and network theories – both of which
extol autonomous agencies as necessary to cope with increasingly complex environments
and emphasize the importance of performance incentives (Verhoest et al., 2004) – in LDCs
the overwhelming preoccupation is with accountability. This is both delaying the transfer of
resources to these units and deferring the construction of incentive structures which
facilitate entrepreneurial thinking. Nurturing these abilities would require policymakers and
policy enablers to encourage autonomous decision-making at the local level through
incentives and structural arrangements which are designed to develop and build support for
more entrepreneurial public sector attitudes in collaboration with local communities. At the
very least, signiﬁcant increases in local stafﬁng and ﬁnancing will be required to replace
sporadic initiatives with larger scaled responses, in the absence of which increased
outmigration is likely to remain the main adaptive reaction (Jha et al., 2017), at least for the
younger andmore educated.
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Notes
1. World Bank Databank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS(Agriculturalproduction)
andhttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS (rural population). (accessed 30 November
2016).
2. In the end, we discovered that more important than altitude was the presence of road
connectivity. Dolakha district, for example, which is in the high mountains, has a good road
connection with Kathmandu, which enables goods and services to move more quickly and
cheaply. Indeed, as the Swiss-ﬁnanced road connected the district, it has grown rapidly to
become a regional hub.
3. Some cash crops such as vegetables and spices do ﬁnd space in local markets, but the levels of
production are low. One notable exception was in the case of Dolakha district, where potato
cultivation has been successful and is marketed as far as Kathmandu.
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